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Distortions of electoral law in the elections to the Polish Sejm 
and Senate1
Abstract: The paper analyzes the evolution of parliamentary electoral law in Poland, applying the 
method of systemic analysis, the legal and comparative method and historical methods. A statistical 
analysis has also been conducted. The paper indicates what factors are related to electoral regula-
tions that result in the deformation of the intentions of citizens. In particular, it discusses the political 
outcomes of the successive changes of electoral laws and their political context. It presents how the 
changes to electoral law deform the intentions of citizens. The paper also examines the real level of the 
legitimization of legislative power in Poland by citizens.
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I. Changes to parliamentary electoral law and political outcomes
Over twenty years of political transition in Poland have been marked by a period of intense discussions on the principles and techniques of electoral law. These have 
resulted in frequent changes in both the detailed solutions applied in elections and pro-
found changes of principles. There have been only two stable electoral laws. No funda-
mental principles have been altered with respect to the presidential elections or elections 
to the European Parliament. Even in these two instances, however, amendments have 
been made, albeit only with respect to details intended to make the law more precise and 
better functioning, while retaining the main principles.
The most profound changes concerned the principles of the elections of deputies to 
the lower chamber of parliament (Polish: Sejm). After partially democratic principles 
were applied in 1989 as a consequence of the political compromise concluded at the 
Round Table, the 1991 electoral law saw the implementation of thoroughly democratic 
principles (Act of June 28, 1991).
A proportional electoral law was applied at that time, with no statutory limitations on 
the access to seats available, even for those groupings that had secured a relatively small 
number of votes, which resulted in the extreme atomization of parliament. Representatives 
of 29 different electoral committees won seats in the Sejm, and even the smallest coalition 
possible had to be composed of as many as six political parties (Stelmach, 1997, p. 61). Such 
fragmentation brought about extreme difficulties with the formation of government. The two-
year term of office of the Sejm (which was shortened by President Lech Wałęsa) saw four 
1 This article has been written within the research project: E-voting as an alternative way of voting 
procedures in national elections. Experiences of selected countries and prospects for implementation 
e-voting in Poland (E-voting jako alternatywna procedura głosowania w elekcjach państwowych. 
Doświadczenia wybranych państw a perspektywy wdrożenia e-głosowania w Polsce) – financed by 
the National Science Center in Poland UMO-2014/15/B/HS5/01358.
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attempts at establishing a Council of Ministers. Only twice did they result in the appointment 
of a government. Two politicians designated to be Prime Minister failed to form a Cabinet.2
In mid-1993, the Sejm of the first term enacted a new electoral law (Act of May 28, 
1993) which retained the general principles of the earlier electoral law. Several detailed 
solutions were introduced making it significantly more difficult for smaller political 
groupings to enter the lower chamber.
The solutions adopted by the new electoral law pertaining to the Sejm gave clear prefer-
ences to larger groupings at the expense of small and medium ones. While these regulations 
considerably limited the representative character of the Sejm, they brought about the political 
stability of parliament. From 1993 to 1997 there were three different governments in Poland, 
but the same coalition stayed in power over the entire term of office.3 The parliament elected 
in 1997 turned out to be even more stable, at least formally. The same electoral law allowed 
the right wing, led by Solidarity Election Action (AWS), to take power again.4 The govern-
ment of Jerzy Buzek appointed after the election lasted the entire term of office.
Another electoral law was passed by parliament in 2001 (Act of April 12, 2001). The 
changes were far from essential. The most significant one concerned the abandonment of 
nationwide electoral lists. The 69 seats won from these lists were divided among 41 elec-
toral districts. The nationwide electoral lists were commonly believed to offer a ‘side 
entrance’ to the Sejm to persons who did not enjoy voter support.
The system for converting votes into seats was also changed. The former d’Hondt 
method was substituted by the modified (Scandinavian) Sainte-Lague method, which 
favored medium size groupings. The latter method was applied only once, in 2001. One 
year later the Sejm decided to return to the d’Hondt method, which has continued to be 
applied ever since in Poland.
The changes in regulations pertaining to the elections to the Senate were definitely less 
dynamic. The first elections to the Senate since WWII were held in June 1989, and they 
were fully democratic. In compliance with the electoral law of the Polish People’s Repub-
lic, the elections were founded on the principle of absolute majority. In multi-seat electoral 
districts, the winners were those who won the biggest number of votes allowing them to 
obtain the mandates allocated to this district. They had to meet one more condition, how-
ever, namely to win over 50% of the votes in their district. This system had to provide for 
another electoral round to be held wherever no single candidate won over 50% of votes, 
or the number of candidates with more than 50% of the votes was smaller than the number 
of mandates in a given district. Candidates who won the biggest number of votes in the 
first round would take part in a second round of elections. The number of candidates in the 
second round was always twice the number of seats left to be filled in that district. In the 
second round, the requirement of an absolute majority was abandoned.
Since the first elections to the Senate, held for the first time since WWII in 1989, 
essential amendments to the electoral law have been made twice. As early as 1991, the 
principle of absolute majority was substituted by the principle of relative majority (Act of 
2 B. Geremek and W. Pawlak were entrusted with the task of forming a government. Both gave up trying.
3 This was a left wing coalition composed of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Polish Peo-
ples’ Party (PSL).
4 Initially, the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) established a coalition government with the Free-
dom Union (UW). After this coalition collapsed, AWS ruled on its own as a minority government.
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May 10, 1991, Art. 17). For twenty years the electoral law pertaining to the upper cham-
ber of parliament was modified only in terms of the general principles of parliamentary 
elections. Fundamental changes in the regulations were introduced by the Electoral Code 
(Act of January 5, 2011), including the introduction of single-member electoral districts. 
The principle of a simple majority of votes has been maintained.
The balance of power in the Senate has been highly dynamic. In 1989, 99 senators were 
elected from the lists of electoral committees set up by the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ 
Solidarność). There was only one independent senator. Political influences in the Senate 
were dynamically changing over the next terms. In 1991, the senators came from as many 
as twelve electoral committees and there were seven independent senators. In 1993, voters 
decided that the representatives of 12 electoral committees would enter the Senate, along-
side three independent candidates. In the next elections, in 1997, the Senate welcomed the 
representatives of only five electoral committees and five independent senators. The results 
were similar in the 2001 elections, as far as the number of representatives of electoral com-
mittees is concerned. There were also two independent senators that time. The 2005 elec-
tions failed to alter these proportions. The Senate continued to feature the representatives 
of five electoral committees and five independent senators. 2007 saw a change, when the 
representatives of only two parties (Civic Platform – PO and Law and Justice – PiS), ac-
companied by a single independent candidate, entered the Senate. The 2011 elections to the 
Senate resulted in the representation of three electoral committees, alongside four indepen-
dent senators. In the most recent elections, in 2015, a different personal representation to the 
Senate emerged, but the division of mandates remained similar. Next to 34 representatives 
of PO, 61 of PiS and one of PSL there are four independent candidates in the Senate.
II. Electoral districts
The size of electoral districts, that is the number of seats allocated to each of them, 
is a crucial issue that is worth discussing. Although it may seem insignificant, it is of 
considerable practical importance. The smaller the number of seats available in a given 
district, the lower the chances that smaller groupings will fill them. Their chances grow 
in line with the number of seats available in a district.
The 1991 electoral law provided for the division of the country into 37 electoral 
districts. The smallest accounted for 7 seats, the biggest for 17. Average size districts 
provided 10–11 deputies to be elected. In 1993, the country was divided into 52 districts 
of 3–17 seats. This meant that fewer deputies were elected from a single district than 
before. An average district accounted for 7–8 seats. This solution was highly beneficial 
for big electoral committees.
The 2001 electoral law introduced yet another change in the number and size of 
electoral districts. The country was divided into 41 districts accounting for 7–19 seats 
each. The average number of deputies elected in a district slightly exceeds 11. The same 
division into electoral districts has been retained in the current Electoral Code. This so-
lution continues to be beneficial for medium and large groupings. It should be borne in 
mind that since nationwide lists were abandoned in 2001, there have been 460 seats to be 
divided among the districts, instead of the former 391.
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After 1989, in elections to the Senate an electoral district was equivalent to a region 
(Polish: województwo). Given the territorial division at the time, there were 49 regions 
and districts. Two senators were elected in each, with the exception of the largest re-
gions: Warsaw and Katowice, with three senators to be elected from each. This principle 
was in place until the administrative division of the country was changed. In 1999, when 
the number of regions was reduced to 16, the areas of electoral districts were changed 
as well.
In compliance with the new electoral law pertaining to the elections to the Sejm and 
Senate alike, in 2001 the country was divided into 41 electoral districts in elections to the 
Sejm and 40 districts in elections to the Senate. The districts of the two chambers over-
lapped, with the exception of two districts in elections to the Sejm established in Warsaw, 
which constituted a single district in elections to the Senate. There were four senators 
elected from this district. Two or three seats were filled by all the remaining districts. No 
other principles pertaining to the elections to the Senate were altered.
It was not until 2011 that the Electoral Code introduced fundamental changes in the 
election of senators. Single-member electoral districts were introduced, thereby dividing 
the country into 100 districts. Voters had one vote at their disposal each, and cast them 
for the candidate who had won their trust. The seat was won by the candidate who se-
cured the biggest number of votes, even if they accounted for less than 50%. ‘The winner 
takes all’ principle was applied.
III. Selection of candidates
The mode and principles of nominating candidates are of utmost importance for elec-
tion procedures to be democratic. This is the initial, essential element of the election 
process: the selection of candidates. If the democratic procedures for nominating can-
didates are infringed here, further selection may be irrelevant. Electoral law in socialist 
states, including Poland, before 1989, operated in such a way that voters could only 
select from among candidates who had been imposed on them. This lack of ability of 
voters to freely nominate their candidates is a violation of the democratic character of 
electoral law.
In Poland, the right to nominate candidates is vested with political parties, their coali-
tions and with the voters. In the latter case, an electoral committee can be established by 
a minimum of fifteen voters, who have to obtain the written support of at least 1,000 vot-
ers. These principles are fair, as similar formal requirements have to be fulfilled by 
a group of individuals who want to register a political party.
An electoral committee is required to collect the signatures of voters who give their 
support to registered election lists under a motion to submit such lists. The provisions 
of the 1991 electoral law stipulated that the number of such signatures should be at least 
5,000. The next electoral law of 1993 reduced the required number of signatures by 
voters from a given electoral district to 3,000. Since 2001, the law has returned to the 
requirement of collecting 5,000 signatures under a motion to submit lists of candidates. 
This increases the chances of big, nationwide electoral committees, and sometimes poses 
a considerable obstacle to small, local committees.
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Starting in 1991, an election committee nominating a candidate to the Senate was 
required to collect the signatures of at least 3,000 voters from a given electoral district. 
If a committee nominated more than one candidate, the supporting signatures had to be 
collected separately for each candidate. The 2011 Electoral Code reduced the number of 
required signatures to 2,000. This is understandable inasmuch as the present electoral 
districts in elections to the Senate are considerably smaller than before, and there are 100 
of them instead of 40. Therefore, the number of voters is smaller, and electoral commit-
tees find it more difficult to collect the signatures.
The electoral law provided certain preferences for big electoral committees in nomi-
nating their lists of candidates for deputies. In conformity with the 1991 electoral law, 
if the total number of voters supporting the lists of candidates for deputies submitted by 
a single electoral committee exceeded 50,000, or a given electoral committee registered 
its lists in at least five different electoral districts, no lists with the signatures of support-
ing voters were required in other districts (Act of June 28, 1991).
The 1993 electoral law reduced the required support threshold for a list of candidates 
submitted by an electoral committee to 3,000 signatures by voters. Electoral committees 
that registered their regional electoral lists in at least half the available electoral districts 
were exempted from this requirement. The requirement to validate a regional electoral 
list with voters’ signatures did not apply to the electoral committees of political, parties, 
organizations or election coalitions which registered a parliamentary caucus of at least 
fifteen members with the Presidium of the Sejm following the previous elections (Act of 
May 28, 1993, Art. 79, Sections 2 and 3).
Another issue local electoral committees may face is the requirement to list at least 
as many candidates on their list as the number of mandates allocated to a given electoral 
district. Some committees have a problem with that since the number of those interested 
in standing as their candidates to the Sejm is not sufficient. This results from the commit-
tee’s negligible chances of overcoming the 5% threshold in the whole country. This barrier 
practically eliminates local electoral committees from competing for seats in the Sejm.
After 1991, 89 seats to the Sejm were filled from nationwide lists of candidates. The 
right to register nationwide lists in 1991 was held by those electoral committees that 
registered their lists in at least five electoral districts (Act of June 28, 1991, Art. 64, Sec-
tion 2 and Art. 76, Section 2). The 1993 electoral law raised the bar, vesting the right to 
register a nationwide list only with those electoral committees that had registered their 
lists in at least half the available electoral districts, or registered a parliamentary caucus 
with the Presidium of the Sejm following the preceding elections. Nationwide lists could 
only feature the names of those candidates who were also on the regional lists of a given 
electoral committee.
In 1991, for an electoral committee to take part in the division of seats allocated to the 
nationwide lists of candidates it was required to obtain mandates in at least five electoral 
districts, or collect a total of at least 5% of valid votes nationwide (Act of June 28, 1991, 
Art. 100, Section 2). The 1993 electoral law altered the conditions to be admitted to the 
division of seats allocated to nationwide lists. An electoral committee that was supported 
by at least 7% of voters nationwide was granted this right (Stelmach, 2003, p. 151).
The seats attributed to a given nationwide list were allocated to the candidates in the 
order in which they were listed, skipping those who had already won seats in their re-
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spective districts. The number of votes collected by a given candidate in his or her home 
district was irrelevant.
Seats allocated to nationwide lists were proportionately divided according to the 
number of votes collected nationwide by all the regional lists of a given electoral com-
mittee. In 1991, the votes were converted into seats by means of a modified Sainte-Lague 
method which favored medium-sized groupings. The 1993 electoral law introduced the 
d’Hondt method, which is more beneficial for big groupings. As mentioned before, na-
tionwide lists were abandoned in 2001.
The 1991 electoral law pertaining to the Sejm made it possible to combine electoral 
lists. Having registered the regional lists of candidates, the representatives of the elec-
toral committees concerned could issue a joint statement concerning the totting up of 
votes cast on their respective lists in their district as a basis for the allocation of seats to 
these combined lists. Provided that the committees made no other reservations in this 
respect, the seats were allocated to the combined lists proportionately to the number of 
votes collected by each list (Act of June 28, 1991, Art. 75).
Later electoral laws did not allow lists to be combined any more. The possibility of 
establishing electoral committee coalitions was introduced in 1993, and such coalitions 
could only be formed by political parties. This solution remains valid at present.
IV. Manipulations of the provisions of electoral law. Election thresholds
The 1993 election results were heavily influenced by the introduction of barrier 
thresholds, that is the requirement of an electoral committee to secure minimum support 
of 5% of voters nationwide. Coalitions of electoral committees were required to meet 
even higher standards in this respect. In order to take part in the division of seats they 
were expected to secure the support of at least 8% of voters nationwide. In 1993, only 
six electoral committees got over the electoral thresholds and divided all the seats among 
themselves. Political groups that had won the support of nearly 35% of voters did not 
enter the Sejm, thereby depriving over one third of voters of representation in the lower 
chamber of parliament (Stelmach, 2010, p. 17). The requirements pertaining to electoral 
thresholds are still valid today. Table 3 illustrates the percentage distribution of votes cast 
for the groupings that failed to enter the Sejm in successive elections.
The electoral committees of national minorities take part in elections to the Sejm un-
der special conditions. They take part in the division of seats in a given electoral district 
even if they do not secure the required, nationwide social support. There is at least one 
deputy-representative of the German minority in each successive Sejm.
The method of converting the number of votes cast for individual electoral lists to 
seats was changed in 1993. The Hare-Niemeyer system that favored smaller groupings 
was replaced by the d’Hondt method that is highly beneficial to big groups at the expense 
of smaller ones.
The then system of converting votes into seats was replaced in 2001 by the modified 
Sainte-Lague method (also called the Scandinavian model) which was beneficial for medi-
um-size groupings. This apparently minor change meant a much worse result for the 2001 
election favorite – the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Pre-election polls indicated that 
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the SLD enjoyed support of up to 50% of voters. The actual result turned out to be lower, 
amounting to 41%, which translated into 47% of the seats, but which was insufficient to 
secure an independent government. Had the d’Hondt system been used to convert votes 
into seats, the results would have been much better for the SLD. In 2002, the Sejm changed 
the method of converting votes into seats again, and reinstated the d’Hondt method, mainly 
through the votes of SLD deputies. This method remains in force today.
“In terms of political outcomes the size of electoral districts is strictly related to the 
electoral thresholds. For instance, having a 5-member, 10-member or 20-member 
electoral district brings about identical results as if a threshold clause of 12.5%, 
6.8% and 3.6% respectively was applied. And vice-versa, a 5% threshold translates 
into the same results as a 14-member electoral district. Simultaneous manipulations 
of these two variables can produce extremely serious consequences in terms of the 
size of the electoral victory or even victory itself” (Michalak, 2004, p. 204).
Another essential issue concerns the territory and size of electoral districts. Gerryman-
dering is about setting the boundaries of electoral districts so as to secure the most desirable 
political gains. It consists in boundary delimitation resulting in the artificial shifting of the 
electorate in order to change election preferences throughout the entire district (Żukowski, 
1999, p. 148). In Poland, gerrymandering practices have not emerged so far.
V. Financing
Election results are to a great extent influenced by the financial resources allocated by 
an electoral committee to election campaigning. It turns out that only a minor part comes 
from public generosity. Election campaigns in Poland are to a large extent financed by the 
State budget, allocating resources to political parties. Electoral committees that have won at 
least one seat in the Sejm or Senate have the right to have their election campaign expenses 
reimbursed by means of earmarked subsidies. Sometimes they are able to recover all the 
expenses incurred. Political parties are entitled to have the entire amount of the subsidy due 
transferred to their bank account and to use it at liberty, in conformity with the law. Vot-
ers’ committees are required to settle the accounts of the election campaign and then close 
their bank accounts, thereby making them unable to retain any money for the next election 
campaign. Table 1 presents the election campaign expenses incurred by different electoral 
committees and the amounts of subsidies earmarked following the 2011 elections.
Table 1
Amounts of earmarked subsidies allocated to political parties and electoral committees 
following the 2011 elections
Political parties and electoral committees
Number 
of seats 
secured 
Election 
campaign 
expenses (PLN)
Earmarked 
subsidy due 
(PLN)
1 2 3 4 5
Political 
parties
Platforma Obywatelska RP (Civic Platform) 270 29,274,776.20 29,274,776.20
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 188 30,120,511.00 30,120,511.00
Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement) 40 1,753,422.87 1,753,422.87
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) 30 12,699,503.72 5,287,607.24
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1 2 3 4 5
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left 
Alliance) 27 24,163,755.58 4,758,846.52
Electoral 
committees 
of voters
Komitet Wyborczy Wyborców Mniejszość Nie-
miecka (German Minority Electoral Committee of 
Voters)
1 226,953.79 176,253.58
Komitet Wyborczy Wyborców Cimoszewicz do 
Senatu (Cimoszewicz for the Senate Electoral 
Committee of Voters
1 24,424.46 24,424.46
Komitet Wyborczy Wyborców Kazimierza Kutza
Electoral Committee of Kazimierz Kutz’s Voters)
1 10,036.04 10,036.04
Komitet Wyborczy Wyborców Marka Borowskie go 
(Electoral Committee of Marek Borowski’s Voters) 1 43,314.01 43,314.01
Komitet Wyborczy Wyborców Rafał Dutkiewicz
Electoral Committee of Rafał Dutkiewicz’s Voters)
1 385,304.12 176,253.58
Total 560 98,702,001.79 71,625,445.50
Source: Own elaboration based on the information of the State Electoral Commission.
The electoral committees of political parties have the additional right to receive a statu-
tory subsidy at an amount related to the number of votes secured nationwide. Regulations 
stipulate the amount of money payable for each vote cast. Only parties whose electoral com-
mittees secured at least 3% of the votes nationwide are entitled to the subsidy. In the case of 
coalitions of electoral committees, the threshold rises to 6% for their coalition. Therefore, 
even parties that did not get over the 5% threshold required to obtain seats in the Sejm are en-
titled to the subsidy. It is paid annually at the same amount for the entire term of office of the 
Sejm. Table 2 presents the amounts of the statutory subsidy political parties are entitled to.
Table 2
Amounts of annual subsidies political parties are entitled to following the elections 
to the Sejm of Poland on October 25, 2015
 Political party Annual amount of the subsidy (PLN)
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 18,543,370.32
Platforma Obywatelska RP (Civic Party) 15,465,516.69
Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru (Ryszard Petru’s Modern Party) 6,207,895.14
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) 4,476,863.19
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* (Democratic Left Alliance) 4,318,845.77
Twój Ruch* (Your Movement) 1,233,955.94
Unia Pracy* (Labor United) 493,582.38
Zieloni* (The Greens) 123,395.60
Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (Coalition for the Renew-
al of the Republic – Freedom and Hope) 4,171,704.23
Partia Razem (Together Party) 3,175,513.73
Total 58,210,642.99
* The amount of the subsidy was determined by dividing the total amount the United Left Coalition 
SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni was entitled to in such proportions as specified in the agreement forming the 
coalition (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: 70%, Twój Ruch: 20%, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna: 0%, Unia 
Pracy: 8%, Zieloni: 2%).
Source: Own elaboration based on the announcements by the State Electoral Commission.
PP 2 ’16 Distortions of electoral law in the elections to the Polish Sejm... 27
The fact that some electoral committees secured such considerable assets as quoted 
in Tables 1 and 2 puts them in a much better position than the remaining political par-
ties. They have a stable financial advantage over their competitors and their position 
in the political system is reinforced. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to break their 
monopoly on the political representation of citizens in the parliament. Nevertheless, new 
political parties do emerge which are able to secure sufficient social support to get their 
representatives in the Sejm. This was the case of the Modern Party (Nowoczesna) and 
Kukiz’15 winning seats in the Sejm in 2015.
VI. Representativeness of power or true support for the authorities. 
Appearances and facts
One element that is indicative of the level of citizen involvement in matters of state 
is voter turnout. Table 4 shows that voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Poland is 
very low, oscillating around 50%. Unfortunately, no upward trend can be seen. While the 
2007 voter turnout was the highest so far, amounting to nearly 54%, it was only 40.57% 
in the preceding elections, when it hit the deepest low in the entire period of political 
transition. Average voter turnout in Sejm and Senate elections is 47.3% of eligible vot-
ers, which is among the lowest ratios in the European Union. This evidences the poor 
political culture of the Polish electorate. The lack of political participation of the major-
ity of citizens means that they are indifferent to the fate of their country, and their own 
fate as well. Voter turnout goes up only at times of political crisis.
Table 3
Support for the electoral committees that won in the elections to the Sejm (%)
Election 
year
No representation 
in the Sejm
(% of voters)
Victorious party
(% of votes)
Ruling coalition at the 
beginning of the term of 
office (% of votes)
Ruling coalition at the 
beginning of the term of 
office (% of seats)
1993 34.52 20.41 35.81 65.90
1997 12.41 33.83 47.20 60.30
2001  9.35 41.04 50.02 56.09
2005 10.93 26.99 46.37* 53.26*
2007  4.12 41.51 50.42 52.17
2011  4.11 39.18 47.54 51.09
2015 16.61 37.58 37.58 51.08
* Law and Justice (PiS), League of Polish Families (LPR), Self-defence (Samoobrona RP).
Source: Own elaboration based on the announcements by the State Electoral Commission.
Legitimization of power is a crucial issue. Matters are simplified by saying that a giv-
en political option has won the elections. In Poland, electoral victory means that a given 
party has secured more votes than any other, but this does not mean that this party has 
won the support of the majority of voters. Poland has been ruled by parties that have 
secured from 20.41% of votes (SLD in 1993) to 41.51% (PO in 2007). This means that 
power has been wielded by political parties that have failed to win the support of the 
majority of voters, let alone the majority of those eligible to vote. The legitimization of 
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power looks slightly better when we take into account the support enjoyed by the ruling 
coalitions. Even here, however, only the majority coalitions formed in the Sejm after the 
elections in 2001 and 2007 enjoyed the support of over 50% of voters.
Table 4
Real support for the victorious electoral committees in the elections to the Sejm 
Election 
year
Voter 
turnout
Number of votes 
cast for the victo-
rious party
Number of votes 
cast for the parties 
forming the ruling 
coalition
Real support for 
the victorious party
(% of citizens)
Real voter support 
for the coalition
(% of citizens)
1993 52.06 2,815,169 4,939,536 10.17 17.85
1997 47.93 4,427,373 6,176,891 15.58 21.74
2001 46.29 5,342,519 6,511,178 18.19 22.17
2005 40.57 3,185,714 5,473,831 10.54 18.11
2007 53.79 6,701,010 8,138,648 21.89 26.58
2011 48.92 5,629,773 6,831,401 18.30 22.21
2015 50.92 5,711,687 5,711,687 18.65 18.65
Source: Own elaboration based on the announcements by the State Electoral Commission.
The support for the authorities measured in absolute terms, that is as a proportion of 
all those eligible to vote rather than in terms of approval expressed by actual voters, is 
considerably lower. The figures in Table 4 show that the legitimization of power ana-
lyzed in this manner is shockingly low. In the best case, it was the support of 21.89% 
for the winning electoral committee and 26.58% of eligible voters supporting the ruling 
coalition. It is hardly possible to speak about democratic rule in the sense of the power of 
the majority. It should rather be said that the parties that rule enjoy the biggest support, 
but only in terms of having won a bigger number of votes cast than any other political 
power that took part in the elections. In these terms, the authorities rule not on behalf 
of the majority of society but power is wielded by the minority that is best organized. 
The degree of the legitimization of power in Poland is low. There are counterarguments, 
though. The legitimization of power in the democratic system that ensures every citizen 
the real possibility to take part in elections is, by definition, sufficient, provided that 
the authorities have won the approval of the majority of those who did go to the polls, 
thereby exercising their civil rights. If eligible voters give these rights up, they consent to 
others making power-related decisions on their behalf. Such behavior should not impair 
the legitimization of authorities elected in the course of democratic and fair elections. 
It may only result in the discomfort of the authorities, who should be aware that only 
a certain portion of society actively expressed their trust in them rather than an absolute 
majority
Conclusions
The system of elections in Poland has undergone considerable transformations dur-
ing the political transition. Optimal solutions are still being sought. The fundamental 
solutions adopted as constitutional standards raise no doubts, whereas detailed solutions 
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are still being debated. The size of electoral districts, that is the number of seats allo-
cated to each one, arouses the biggest emotions. Single-member electoral districts enjoy 
considerable support also in elections to the Sejm, but their introduction would require 
the constitutional principle of proportionality to be changed. An intermediate option has 
not been ruled out, namely a mixed electoral law pertaining to the Sejm. Its proponents 
suggest that half of the Sejm be elected in single-member electoral districts. The re-
maining deputies in the lower chamber would be elected by means of a proportional 
system, although it is not settled how the seats would be allocated within this system. It 
would either be the same way it is at present, that is by means of multi-member electoral 
districts where voters indicate their political and personal preferences, or by means of 
returning to a certain kind of nationwide list where voters would be limited to indicating 
only the political option they are in favor of, while being unable to indicate their support 
for a specific candidate from the electoral committee of their choice.
The advocates of single-member electoral districts assume that voters would be driv-
en by personal preferences rather than by their party affiliations. This would result in 
stronger bonds between citizens and their representatives in the parliament. Such a solu-
tion would favor local political and social activists, while weakening the monopoly of 
political parties to wield power. The results of the elections to the Senate in 2011 and 
2015 failed to confirm this assumption, though.
“The significance of decisions that determine the shape of the electoral system 
in a given state is rooted in several factors. Firstly, the electoral system directly 
determines the degree to which elections are proportional or non-proportional. The 
decision about the number of parties in the parliament affects the shape of the 
party system and is decisive for what type of cabinet is formed (single-party or 
coalition). First and foremost, the electoral system is this element of the political 
system than can be used to current political ends in an easy and efficient manner” 
(Michalak, 2004, p. 200).
Electoral law should take into account the specific character and determinants of the 
country where it is valid. The basic catalogue of factors should encompass the following:
historical tradition, –
level of democracy, –
political culture of society, –
specific nature of political behavior, –
character of the political arena, –
social divisions, –
nature of social conflicts, –
standard of living (economic status), –
character of the competition among political elites, –
geographical and climate conditions. –
Poland is a good example showing the complexity of determinants of an electoral 
system. The dynamic changes in the electoral regulations, and the temptation to use 
them to short-term political ends, is far from exceptional. When democracy is just be-
ing formed, the adoption of generally accepted and durable solutions pertaining to the 
legitimization of power is among the factors that solidify the foundations of democracy 
and are a prerequisite of its further development.
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It is frequently said that steps should be taken to ensure higher voter turnout. These 
should be fully supported, if they are about raising the level of the political culture in 
society, and encouraging citizens who are politically passive to take part in elections. 
There are, however, serious concerns about the ideas of employing various administra-
tive instruments to force citizens to cast votes. It seems much more advantageous for 
democracy and the political system if citizens exercise their sovereign right out of their 
own will, and make conscious decisions, instead of being forced to decide about issues 
they know nothing about, when they do not understand the mechanisms of politics.
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Deformacje w prawie wyborczym do Sejmu i Senatu w Polsce 
 
Streszczenie
W artykule przeprowadzono analizę ewolucji parlamentarnego prawa wyborczego w Polsce. Zasto-
sowano metodę analizy systemowej, prawno-porównawczą oraz metody historyczne. Przeprowadzono 
także analizę statystyczną. Wskazano na czynniki związane z regulacjami prawa wyborczego, które po-
wodują deformację woli obywateli. W szczególności przedstawiono polityczne skutki kolejnych zmian 
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ordynacji wyborczych i ich polityczną konotację. Wykazano w jaki sposób zmiany w prawie wybor-
czym deformują wolę obywateli. Zbadano również realny poziom legitymizacji władzy ustawodawczej 
w Polsce przez obywateli.
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